From the article, When Does Voice Lead to Exit? It Depends on Leadership, analyze the three characteristics that demonstrate readiness to lead change. Conclude which characteristics or behaviors tend to increase employee turnover and/or demonstrate the manager's inability to properly lead change.
® Academy of Management Journal 2013. Vol. 56. No. 2. 525-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0041
WHEN DOES VOICE LEAD TO EXIT? IT DEPENDS ON LEADERSHIP
ELIZABETH J. McCLEAN Cornell University
ETHAN R. BURRIS University of Texas-Austin
JAMES R. DETERT Cornell University
We examine the unit-level relationship between employee voice and exit with multi- source data collected over two time periods in 136 restaurants. We find that three managerial characteristics that signal the ability and willingness to engage in change— management team change orientation, manager participation in decision making, and manager access to organizational resources—moderate the unit-level relationship be- tween voice and exit: Employee voice is positively related to turnover when each of these factors is low and negatively related to turnover when each is high. Implications for research on voice, leadership, and turnover are discussed.
When employees experience problems or ob- serve opportunities for improvement at work, do they engage in improvement-oriented voice—that is, speak up in ways that challenge the status quo to someone with the perceived power to act (Detert & Burris, 2007)? Or do they exit their organization in response to these suboptimal situations? Questions such as these about employee voice and exit have been of interest to organizational scholars at least since Hirschman (1970), in his exit-loyalty-voice (ELV) framework, laid the groundwork for exami- nation of these responses to dissatisfaction with some aspect of an organization's functioning or product line. In the subsequent decades, scholars have attempted to understand why employees speak up or exit by treating these behaviors as discrete, mutually exclusive choices that each in- dividual employee makes because of his or her dissatisfaction (Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Main- ous, 1988; Rusbuh, Zembrodt, & Gunn, 1982). Be- cause voice can lead to examination of underlying causes and cures of employee dissatisfaction, in contrast to exit or silent loyalty, it is seemingly the response most likely to contribute directly to organ- izational learning (Withey & Cooper, 1989). It is therefore not surprising that scholars and practitio- ners alike have become increasingly focused on understanding the antecedents and outcomes of discretionary, improvement-oriented input by em- ployees (Detert & Biu-ris, 2007; Morrison, 2011; Van
Dyne & LePine, 1998). Simultaneously, under- standing of the dynamics underlying employee ttirnover (i.e., exit) continues to develop on the basis of several decades of focused theory and re- search (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Lee & Mitchell, 1994; Maertz & Griffeth, 2004).
As noted first by Barry (1974), by suggesting that voice and exit are directly inversely related, Hirschman may have misspecified the model by combining into one what is actually two distinct choices for employees: (1) choosing voice or silence and, (2) choosing to stay or exit their organization. Taking Barry's arguments seriously would imply that, in line with Hirschman's arguments, employ- ees may sometimes speak up and remain in their organization irrespective of how much or how quickly things change. Or, contrary to Hirschman's model, employees may speak up and subsequently exit the organization because of what happens (or fails to) in response to voice. Yet these possibilities remain largely unexplored in organizational re- search (Btirris, Detert, & Chiabiu'u, 2008; Morrison, 2011), despite the costliness of turnover for organ- izations. Thus, we examine the relationship be,- tween voice and exit to begin to understand the conditions under which employee voice leads to higher or lower rates of exit.
We further depart from prior research in the Hirschman tradition, and some of the logic on which it rests, by examining the relationship be-
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tween voice and exit at the unit, rather than indi- vidual, level. We do so for two reasons. First, the very nature of voice as a prosocial behavior in the organizational literature (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006) suggests that the improvements stemming from the input of any one employee should have spillovers that affect a broader work environment. That is, voice is a "discretionary ex- pression of change-oriented comments" intended to "to benefit others, such as the organization" (Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003: 1370-1371; see Detert and Burris [2007] and Morrison and Milliken [2000] for similar definitions). To be prosocial, and thus meet organizational scholars' definition of voice, an employee's input about needed improve- ments does not primarily benefit just the one indi- vidual who spe^cs up, but instead has the possibil- ity of bettering the situation for a broader set of employees around the speaker (Grant & Mayer, 2009). Despite the fact that managers form in- groups and out-groups among their subordinates (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997) and primarily attend to suggestions made bj' only those in their in-group (Biu-ris, Rod- gers, Mannix, Hendron, & Oldroyd, 2009), the changes that do or do not occur in a unit as a result of voice are not readily allocated only to favored members. Organizational scholars have long recog- nized this collective aspect of voice in noting its potential positive outcomes for a unit (versus only individuals who spoke up); these outcomes include learning (Edmondson, 2003), better error detection (Argyris & Scbön, 1978), innovation (Nemeth, 1997), and change effectiveness (Morrison & Mil- liken, 2000). Likewise, many or all of a unit's em- ployees—not just those who spoke up—should continue to experience dissatisfaction and associ- ated negative outcomes when voice is ignored or disregarded. Thus, both the nature of employee voice behavior through its focus on collective im- provement, and decades of organizational theory and research indicating that employee attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes in a defined unit are so- cially influenced and interdependent (e.g., Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), suggest the importance of moving beyond the implied as- sumption in Hirschman's model that each employ- ee's satisfaction, voice, and relationship status with an organization can be considered independently and devoid of the larger social context.
Second, voice in itself does not automatically make things better or worse for those who speak up or anyone else. Instead, the potential value of voice
rests on what someone with the power to take action—which usually means "management"—does with the suggestions made. The next steps taken by a manager can result in improvement for many in a unit, in no meaningful change at all, or in a situa- tion actually getting worse in employees' minds. When managers have the ability and motivation to take action based on the prosocial suggestions of their employees, voice should improve the morale and decrease the rate of exit of employees in a unit or an organization, including both those who spoke up and the many others who did not. Likewise, employees of all types should collectively feel that employees, as a group, have some control over out- comes (Barry & Shapiro, 2000; Greenberg, 2000), be more satisfied with outcomes (Shapiro, 1993), and thus be more likely to remain with their organiza- tion because managers consider employees' opin- ions and make subsequent changes. Even if changes are not always made as a result of their own or others' input, employees should be more likely to choose to stay and less likely to be fired in envi- ronments where management demonstrates a gen- eral responsiveness to employee input (Tyler, 1987).
But not all managers are able and motivated to take action on the suggestions made by their em- ployees. The level of responsiveness and subse- quent action taken by management to address is- sues raised by employees varies (Detert & Burris, 2007), maldng the prospect of voice directly influ- encing employee turnover contingent rather than certain. When managers are not able or motivated to address prosocial, improvement-oriented issues raised, the broader set of employees, in addition to the speaker(s), continues to experience the condi- tions that prompted voice by some. This, in turn, should lead more members of tbat unit to conclude that it is futile to speak up (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Morrison & Milliken, 2000), to lose faith that man- agers will make necessary improvements (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003), and, thus, to leave the firm. To regain a sense of perceived control and equity, employees who feel impotent in the face of nonresponsive, nonimproving conditions may be- gin to give less of themselves to their organization, perform less well (Blader & Tyler, 2009), or even engage in deviant behaviors (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). As a result, managers may take steps to re- move employees who passively or actively under- mine the attainment of the goals of the managers' units (Giàcalone & Greenberg, 1997; Litsky, Ed- dleston, & Kidder, 2006; PariUa, Hollinger, & Clark, 1988). Thus, voice may increase the level of subse-
2013 McGlean, Burris, and Detert 527
quent turnover in a unit if managers are not responsive.
In this article we therefore examine the unit-level relationship between voice and exit among groups of employees who share a work environment and argue that this relationship is contingent on mana- gerial responsiveness to voice. More specifically, we argue that the relationship between unit-level voice and exit depends on three characteristics of managerial responsiveness: whether the managers who receive it (the targets of voice) have access to organizational resources to implement change; whether they are able to participate actively in organizational decision making; and the change orientation of the management team. These pro- posed moderators reflect whether management is able and motivated to respond to employee sugges- tions for improvement in ways that affect subse- quent turnover.
In what follows, we begin by explaining in detail why the proposed unit-level relationship between employee voice and employee turnover is contin- gent on the responsiveness of managers. Then, be- fore testing the three proposed moderating hypoth- eses, we directly examine the premise that employees in general, not just speakers or favored employees, share improvements stemming from managerial responsiveness to voice. We do so through an analysis of 3,388 open-ended sugges- tions for change from employees of a national res- taurant chain wherein coders considered whether managerial responsiveness to a suggestion would ' benefit primarily the individual who provided the input or, as argued here, multiple employees in the same unit. Finally, we test our hypotheses using multisource, longitudinal perceptual and objective data from 5,200 employees, 372 managers, and 136 general managers in the same organization.
Our work makes three primary contributions. First, we demonstrate the clear value of attending theoretically and empirically to the inherently prosocial, collective nature of voice and its out- comes in work settings. We extend Hirschman's (1972) framework by focusing on the social context in which employee voice takes place, arguing that the benefits of successfully addressing employee voice extend beyond the focal individual speaking up; voice can affect the rate of turnover for others in the individual's unit whose performance or well- being are likewise affected by the issues raised. Second, oiu: study extends scholars' understanding of the complex relationship between voice and exit by showing how voice can increase or decrease
employee turnover depending on the degree to which managers display characteristics reflecting the motivation and ability to respond. We also demonstrate the importance to theory and practice of considering management behaviors not only as antecedents to voice behavior (Detert & Burris, 2007; Edmondson, 1999) but also as moderators of its effects. Third, our study contributes to the unit- level turnover literatvire by considering how and why improvement-oriented voice, and managerial responsiveness to it, help explain this critical or- ganizational outcome.
VOICE, MANAGERIAL RESPONSIVENESS, AND EXIT: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Many voice scholars have argued that voice is good for work units and organizations (e.g., Morri- son, 2011). High levels of voice can be indicative of a learning environment in which employees and managers actively engage in activities to continu- ously reduce errors, improve organizational rou- tines, and produce innovations (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Edmondson, 2003; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974). Employees in strong learning environments should be more likely to stay (i.e., turnover should be lower) because their situation likely improves as a result of the implementation of improvement- oriented ideas and because they likely feel invigo- rated by membership in an innovative environment in which their input is regularly considered (Sha- piro, 1993). Voice scholars have also acknowl- edged, though, that not all such "high-voice" envi- ronments are likely to experience positive outcomes. Continued managerial inability or un- willingness to respond effectively to voice can re- sult in widely shared futility perceptions among employees (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Dutton & Ash- ford, 1993) and a broad climate in which employ- ees feel impotent, not valued, and no longer willing to put forth high levels of effort. In these environ- ments, employees should be more likely to volun- tarily remove themselves from the organization or be forced to exit as a consequence of their deterio- rated attitude and work performance.
We argue that the responsiveness of unit manag- ers will play an important role in determining when voice will lead to less or more exit in a unit. Añer all, employees speak up because they cannot fix problems or pursue opportunities by them- selves, needing instead someone with more formal power to address the issues they have identified (Detert & Burris, 2007). Managerial responsiveness
528 Academy of Management Journal April
can he captured hy two dimensions. First, the ahil- ity to respond to voice may enable or impede man- agers (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Kotter, 1996). Such ability may stem from access to organiza- tional resources necessary to investigate, imple- ment, and institutionalize organizational changes (Damanpour, 1991; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Singh, 1986). Without access to resources, managers will be less able to experiment with changes and thus be limited to a focus on efficient execution of current policies and practices (March, 1991). And, hecause most managers are not in a position to unilaterally decide on changes, responsiveness to voice from below also likely hinges on a manager's influence on decisions made hy more senior leaders (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Glauser, 1984). Second, managers' overall motivation or orientation toward change may affect how they respond to voice (Beer, 2009). This managerial orientation involves a proactive identification of problems and opportunities and a proclivity to take action to address what has been surfaced (Detert & Burris, 2007; Grant & Ashford, 2008; Saunders, Sheppard, Knight, & Rofli, 1992).
We examine below three specific factors that sig- nal managers' ability and motivation to respond to voice and therefore affect the likelihood of subse- quent turnover in a unit. We begin hy examining managers' perceived access to the organizational resources needed to respond to employee input as a factor influencing the unit-level voice-exit relation- ship. Next, we examine managers' level of partici- pation in higher-level decision making as a reflec- tion of their ability to enact change in their own units. Finally, we examine the change orientation of the management team that must address em- ployee voice. Figure 1 summarizes our theoreti- cal model.
Unit Manager Access to Organizational Resources
Organizational resources, such as those used for training and development programs, marketing, or new process implementation, are necessary for im- provement and adaptation in organizations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). These resources, however, are often unequally distributed throughout an organization (Pfeffer, 1981), and accessing them is at least par- tially a function of manager proactivity and skill (Graen, Cashman, Ginsburgh, & Schiemann, 1977; Molm, 1990). Managers who are able to acquire resources will be more capable of making changes (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) because they will have the necessary capital, whether hu- man or financial, to devote to improvement activi- ties (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). Without the slack cre- ated hy additional resources, managers axe less able to experiment with changes and are confined to a focus on efficient execution of current policies and practices (March, 1991).
The extent to which managers garner access to resources should affect the voice-exit relationship hecause resources give managers the ability to act on or at least seriously consider employees' input. When a unit manager can access resources from elsewhere in her or his organization, the support that the manager gets in the form of these resources trickles down to lower-level employees (Erdogan & Enders, 2007), who are thus likely to view hoth their manager and the organization she/he embod- ies as supportive and responsive (Eisenberger et al., 2010). For example, if employees speak up about an issue that is detrimental to their work unit (such as insufficiently trained new hires performing
FIGURE 1 Theoretical Model
Manager Access to
Organizational Resources
Manager Participation in
Decision Making
Employee Voice (unit level)
Management Team Change Orientation
Employee Turnover (unit level)
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poorly], managers need resources to invest in more or better training programs and to keep their units appropriately staffed diu-ing the training. When a unit's manager can obtain the necessary resources and properly train new hires, others in the unit who were negatively affected by the performance of new hires—not just the one or few who spoke up— should feel better about the unit. Specifically, be- cause the manager was able to obtain resources to respond to voice, employees should feel that the organization's agents care about tbeir well-being and experience a heightened sense of organiza- tional support (Shanock & Eisenberger, 2006]. The decision to stay in the organization is one way employees who benefit from managerial respon- siveness can demonstrate reciprocity for organiza- tional support (Erdogan & Enders, 2007; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002].
Conversely, where managers lack access to re- sources needed to address upward input, employ- ees will grow increasingly frustrated by the lack of responsiveness and feel that an organization is less supportive (Shanock & Eisenberger, 2006]. Because managers are seen as embodiments of an organiza- tion's values (Eisenberger et al., 2010], managerial inability to respond to employees' voice because of lack of resources is likely to be experienced by employees as organizational disinterest in them and their ideas for improvement (Rhoades & Eisen- berger, 2002]. When employees reach the conclu- sion that they are not being supported by their organization, they are more likely to quit (Allen, Shore, & Griffeth, 2003]. Or they may withdraw from the organization in more indirect ways (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002]. As is well known from equity theory, when employees perceive an imbalance between what they give and what they receive, they often attempt to restore equity by en- gaging in counterproductive work behaviors, being absent, or underperforming (Adams, 1965]. In this way, employees' legitimate frustration about work conditions cind lack of satisfying managerial re- sponse can lead to inappropriate responses that ultimately get employees fired (Giacalone & Green- berg, 1997; Litsky et al., 2006; Pariila et al., 1988]. For example, employees who do not get promised raises or necessary support through additional hir- ing or training because a manager lacks access to resources may end up being terminated for the shirking, stealing, or other unacceptable behavior that they resort to.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that when employees speak up and managers do not
have access to resources to address their ideas and concerns, employees will develop attitudes and en- gage in behaviors that lead to increased voluntary and involuntary exit.
Hypothesis 1. A unit manager's access to or- ganizational resources moderates the unit- level relationship between employee voice and exit: The relationship between voice and exit is negative when the manager's access to organ- izational resources is high and positive when the manager's access to organizational re- sources is low.
Unit Manager Participation in Decision Making
The structure of most organizations of even mod- est size is such that most managers are subordinate to other managers—that is, most bosses also have bosses. Thus, most middle managers serve as "link- ing pins" between organizational levels, working to synchronize operating activities at one level with broader strategic imperatives at higher levels (Lik- ert, 1967]. From a top-down perspective, this link- ing role may be seen as managers at one level im- plementing the decisions made at higher levels. However, middle- and lower-level managers often have their fingers on the pulse of their organization in such a way that effective linking also means they participate in decision making by helping higher- level leaders understand what is needed to success- fully implement strategic directives and which di- rectives do not fit the reality faced by lower-level employees (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Nonaka, 1988].
Managers who influence the decision-making process of senior-level managers have the ability to advocate for issues that employees raise. Having input from their ranks considered in higher-level decision making should increase employees' sense of procedural justice (Avery & Quiñones, 2002; Thi- baut & Walker, 1975] because it reaffirms that their proximal manager and those higher in their organ- ization value employees and their ideas (Lind & Tyler, 1988]. For example, if some employees speak up with ideas for improving customer service rou- tines that repeatedly lead to customer complaints, participation in higher-level decision making in- creases the likelihood that a local manager can make the changes needed to address employees' input. Because employees discuss among them- selves how their managers respond to their input and recognize that they are collectively affected by any changes that result (Leung & Li, 1990; Nau-
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maim & Bennett, 2000), they often develop a shared sense of procedural justice (Colquitt, Noe, & Jack- son, 2002). Thus, when a manager is able to suc- cessfully advocate for rank-and-file ideas for im- provement to higher-level leaders, a greater number of employees within the manager's unit should feel that decisions made in their work environment are just and should thus be more likely to stay in the organization (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & I'ay- lor, 2000; Simons & Roberson, 2003).
In contrast, if managers have limited ability to make changes in their own units because they are unable to influence higher-level decision making, employees will be less likely to feel that the organ- ization considers problems and ideas of people at their level (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In this case, employees will .view the organization as less fair and will be more likely to exit (Masterson et al., 2000). For example, if their manager is unable to influence higher-level leaders to make improve- ments to a particular food preparation process that is cumbersome, wasteful, and potentially danger- ous, a restaurant's employees are more likely to feel disgruntled and disappointed and to subsequently leave the organization. When managers cannot par- ticipate in and influence decision making, some employees (whether they spoke up about an issue or not) may also respond to the perceived unfair- ness of their situation, and the feelings this evokes, by taking action directly against the organization (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Counterproductive work behaviors (Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001), un- derperformance (Bagozzi, 2003), and absenteeism (Hausknecht, Hiller, & Vance, 2008) are all poten- tial responses to the frustration and negative emo- tions employees experience when they feel they are being treated unfairly or they are unable to control their own environment. When employees engage in these types of behaviors, they are more likely to get fired (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Litsky et al., 2006; Parilla et al., 1988). Therefore, when employ- ees speak up to the manager of a unit who does not participate in higher-level decision making, em- ployees in that unit will collectively be more likely to leave the organization either voluntarily or involuntarily.
Hypothesis 2. A unit manager's participation in decision making moderates the unit-level relationship between employee voice and exit: The relationship between voice and exit is neg- ative when the manager's participation in de- cision making is high and positive when the
manager's participation in decision making is low.
Management Team Change Orientation
Despite popular deification of single leaders, strategic interpretation and decisions to make im- provements are usually not made exclusively by just one person (Burgelman & Sayles, 1986; Chan- dler, 1962; Drucker, 1974; Mintzberg, 1973). In- stead, management teams, often comprised of lead- ers and their direct reports, share collective responsibility for interpreting strategic issues and creating change. Specifically, management teams will be effective at creating change and signaling to employees that they are willing to make changes to the extent that members work well together to spot issues, make improvement plans, and commit col- lectively to implementing decisions (Chandler, 1962; Hackman, 1987; March & Simon, 1958; Yukl, 2002).
When employees speak up and a management team is more change oriented, employees will view their managers as willing to experiment and as not overly committed to the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Kanter, 1983). Given that one of the roles of those in charge is to direct and control change in aii organization (Mint- zberg, 1973) and that such an orientation fits most people's "implicit leader theory" (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Sch)ais & Meindl, 2005), employees likely expect "good" managers to be motivated to identify and work together to address opportiuiities to improve their organization (Porter & Steers, 1973). When this occurs, employees will feel that their organization (through its management team) has met its obligations to respond to their ideas for improvement (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). For ex- ample, if a group of workers is having trouble serv- ing customers quickly enough, the management team comprised of shift supervisors and the general manager will need to work together in a coordi- nated fashion to identify the underlying issues, make an improvement plan, and successfully im- plement it. If management teams can routinely do these things, employees should, as a group, be more likely to feel that managers have fulfilled their ob- ligations to address employees' concerns (Ho, 2005), and thus be more likely to stay.
But not all managers are equally open-minded about or committed to change (Hambrick et al., 1993). When employees speak up and their local management team is less change oriented, em-
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ployee expectations about good management will be unmet (Mintzberg, 1973; Porter & Steers, 1973). Because local managers are seen as embodiments of their larger organization (Eisenberger et al., 2010; Levinson, 1965), employees will likely also con- clude to some extent that that the organization as a whole is not responsive to employees' needs or ideas for improvement. Such beliefs can lead to employees' conclusion that their implicit or psy- chological contract with the organization is being breached (Robinson, 1996; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993). Employees may respond to this un- satisfactory state by quitting (Rousseau, 1995) or by expressing their frustration and disappointment through organizational deviance (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993). Counter- productive work behaviors, such as theft or sabo- tage, often stem from unaddressed dissatisfying work conditions (Robinson & Bennett, 1997) and from employees' perception that the organization has failed to live up to obligations and expectations (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Alternatively, em- ployees may engage in less severe, yet still disrup- tive, behaviors such as slapping work (Hausknecht et al., 2008) or withholding effort (Kidwell & Ben- nett, 1993; Turnley, Bolino, Lester, & Bloodgood, 2003) in response to a lethargic management re- sponse. Regardless of the specific means, most em- ployee responses to their frustration and disap- pointment are likely to be undesirable from management's perspective and thus increase em- ployees' likelihood of being fired (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Litsky et al., 2006; PariUa et al., 1988). Taken together, the above arguments suggest that employee voice targeted to less change- oriented management teams will lead to a higher incidence of overall exit by those management teams' employees.
Hypothesis 3. A unit management team's change orientation moderates the unit-level re- lationship between employee voice and exit: The relationship between voice and exit is neg- ative when management team change orienta- tion is high and positive when management team change orientation is low.
METHODS
We collected both qualitative and quantitative data from employees of 136 restaurants in four divisions of a corporation-owned chain located in 21 states throughout the United States. Each restau-
rant employs three types of workers: one general manager (GM) per restaurant, restaurant shift su- pervisors (approximately 2-7 per restaurant), and hourly employees (e.g., cooks and servers; approx- imately 20-80 per restaurant).
We obtained 3,388 qualitative responses from (58 percent of) the hourly employees who com- pleted our entire survey in the 136 restaurants. The comments reflect written responses to the open- ended question. What is the one thing that would improve this restaurant as a place to work? We coded these employee suggestion data to assess whether, in fact, most employee voice can right- fully be considered prosocial—that is, whether sug- gestions have the potential for broad benefit rather than just improvement in the speaker's well-being. If employee suggestions have the potential to ben- efit many employees (and an organization itself) through actions taken by managers, this finding would lend support to the contention that it is appropriate and important to examine the unit- level outcomes of voice.
We followed a rigorous process for coding the open-ended comments to determine whether voice is inherently prosocial—that is, likely to affect mul- tiple employees if leaders take action on the sug- gestions made. First, we used approximately 10 percent of the open-ended comments to hone a coding scheme that categorized the comments into three categories: (1) "speaker only": comments that, if responded to, would only affect the one em- ployee speaking up; (2) "multiple people": com- ments that, if responded to, would affect multiple employees in the speaker's work unit; (3) "un- clear": comments for which the scope of beneficia- ries could not be clearly determined. To be conser- vative, we also included "split cases," (when an employee provided multiple ideas for improve- ment, at least one of which could affect multiple employees and at least one other of which would only affect the speaker) in the third ("unclear") category. Next, the first author and a research as- sistant (not otherwise involved in this research) worked independently to code the remaining 3,028 employee comments. Interrater agreement on the classification of these 3,028 employee improve- ment suggestions was high, as evidenced by a Cohen's kappa of .92 (Landis & Koch, 1977). In a subsequent discussion, the coders reached agree- ment on the best classification for each of the small number of comments they had initially coded differently.
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The results of this coding overwhelmingly sup- port organizational scholars' definition of voice as a prosocial behavior—that is, as one with the poten- tial to benefit more than just the speaker if acted upon: Approximately 94 percent of employees' comments were coded as affecting the well-being of more than just the speaker, with just 3 percent being coded as affecting only the speaker and the remaining 3 percent being coded as unclear in re- gard to potential breadth of benefit. Sample com- ments from each of these categories are shown in Table 1. This result lends support to the notion that an employee's exit can be affected by managerial responsiveness, or lack thereof, to the input pro- vided by coworkers in the same unit as the employee.
To test our three unit-level moderator hypothe- ses, we used quantitative survey and objective data from the 136 restaurants in our sample. We used four different sources to avoid common method and single soiu:ce problems. We collected our inde- pendent variable (voice) from questionnaires ask- ing the shift supervisors to rate each employee's level of voice. We assessed the moderator variables (unit manager access to organizational resources, unit manager participation in decision making, and local management team change orientation) using survey responses from GMs. Gontrol variables were
collected from a survey given to all employees and from the GM surveys. The sin-vey data come from 5,200 employees, 372 managers, and the 136 res- taurant general managers. The average survey re- sponse rate per store was 74 percent, with a range of from 24 to 100 percent. Objective turnover data were provided by the corporate HR department.
Measures
Unit-level voice. We measured employees' voice expressed to their supervisors using three items (a = .95) rated by their shift supervisors on a fre- quency scale ranging from 1 ("almost never") to 5 ("almost always"). In most cases, multiple supervi- sors rated an employee's level of voice (on average, 1.85 shift supervisors rated each employee, with a maximum of 7 raters). We adapted items from Van Dyne and LePine's (1998) prosocial voice scale. The items (prefaced by the words "This employee") were, "develops and makes recommendations con- cerning the restaurant," "speaks up and encourages others to get involved in issues that affect the res- taurant," and "speaks up with ideas for new proj- ects or changes in procedures." We then aggregated the ratings for employee voice to the restaurant level and calculated aggregation statistics to test for significant differences between restaurants. Specif-
TABLEl Qualitative Data Analysis Coding Examples
Code
Impact broader tJaan input provider
Impact on provider only
Unclear or mixed
Example
"I have been trying for the last 6 months to be cross-trained and the last 3 months to be a trainer and neither has happened. I feel like I am being held back. I would like to be paid more for the work I do.'
"I have worked for the company for 3 years. I make $7.25 an hour and I do EOD, inventory, and deposits. Why is this? I feel that I am not important to this company and what I do here means squat."
"I would like to have flexible hours so I could have the days off that I want." "This place would be most improved as a place to work if I got off on time."
"There should be two people in the dish room. One to wash and one to put away. I want more hours." "I think the guest count should be determined on those using the daily ACE." "I hate server side work! We should have a kickball team. I hate throwing away good food when
someone could eat it but we have to throw it away." "Seating charts."
Percent
"Not paying your workers that have been here for 3+ years $7-58. Yet new hires sometimes walk through the door making $8.50 and $9 and up—so this isn't right. We as a company need to work on paying our old hires more money for their jobs. Let's make a change."
"Better training for new associates. Our store has recently hired a bunch of new people but without the adequate number of trainers available to train them. The results have been poorly trained and uninformed new employees and less than adequate service."
"The place needs to be better organized. There are too many mistakes, tbe rules aren't followed strictly. We run out of things (such as straws) and people leave without doing their sidework."
"We need better service and faster food preparation. There are days where it takes 20 minutes for all our food and drinks to come up. Tbis makes our servers look bad."
94%
3%
3%
2013 McClean, Burris, and Detert 533
ically, we computed ICCl, which reveals the extent to which group membership predicts variability in individual level responses, and ICC2, which esti- mates the reliability of between-group differences in a measure. Aggregation statistics indicated that significant differences existed between restaurants and that the unit-level voice construct was mea- sured reliably (ICCl = 0.11, ICC2 = 0.76, p < .01) (Bliese, 2000).
Unit managerial access to organizational re- sources. We measured managerial access to organ- izational resovirces using six items (a = .93). Be- cause the measurement of resources varies considerably across studies (Crook, Ketchen, Comhs, & Todd, 2008), which highlights the con- text specificity of this construct, we developed the items through extensive interviews with senior leaders from multiple levels of the studied organi- zation. These leaders identified the specific re- sources that they deemed necessary to make im- provements and changes affecting the restaurants. For instance, restaurant GMs often need access to resources from higher in the organization for staff training or to successfully make improvements to operating policies or procedures in a specific res- taurant. Thus, in conjunction with these senior leaders, we developed items tapping the specific resources that GMs could use to make material changes internal to their restaurants: "The DM pro- vides the necessary support for . . . "training," "marketing," "new process implementation," "growth/development programs," "evaluation and planning," and "communication to crew mem- bers." The items were rated by GMs on a scale ranging from 1 ("never") to 5 ("always").
Unit manager participation in decision mak- ing. We measured managerial participation in de- cision making using three items (a =.91) based on Siegel and Ruh's (1973) five-item measure. The GM of each restaurant rated his/her participation in decision making at the division level (i.e., the man- agement level above him/her). The items were, "I have influence on division managers' (DM) deci- sions affecting the restaurant"; "I participate in DM decisions ahout my job"; and "I have influence on DM decisions affecting me and my job." GMs rated these items on a scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree").
Management team change orientation. We de- veloped the items for management team change orientation on the basis of the specific behaviors that the organization's leaders identified as critical to creating change at the restaurant level. Before we
created these items, we scoured the literature for appropriate items tapping improvement-oriented management team behaviors. However, we did not find a suitable measure. Most leadership measures tap specific styles (behaviors) (e.g., relational or task-oriented leadership [Yukl & Nemeroff, 1979]), personality-driven behaviors (e.g., charismatic leadership theories [Conger & Kanungo, 1998]), or broad sets of hehavior that encompass but do not directly measure specific behaviors that promote changes (e.g., transformational leadership theories [Bass & Avolio, 1994]). We thus developed a mea- sure to assess specific behaviors that tap a manage- ment team's motivation to act upon and follow through with improvement opportunities. We mea- sured local management team's change orientation using two items [a = .68) rated hy the GM associ- ated with a focal team. The GM is the most appro- priate respondent to measiire a restaurant manage- ment team's change orientation hecause he or she leads the team and is familiar with the functioning of the entire team. The items were, "The manage- ment team (including yourself). . ." "spots issues quickly and does something ahout them" and "makes improvement plans and sticks to them." GMs rated these items on a scale ranging from 1 ("never") to 5 ("always").
Unit-level turnover. We measured employee tiunover as the rate at the restaurant level for the six months after employee voice ratings were col- lected. We used a six-month period hecause we learned from discussions with the restaurant's ex- ecutive team (e.g., CEO, CFO, VP of operations) that the restaurants operate in quarters and that they believed that if employees spoke up with an idea for improvement, most likely it would take one to two quarters for the issue to he heard, vetted, and addressed to the extent that improvement (or lack of) could be assessed. Second, the average annual turnover rate in this restaurant chain is 180 percent per year, which means that a high percentage of the employees who answered our surveys would no longer he employed after six months (two quarters) had passed. Thus, using a period shorter than six months risked having insufficient time pass to assess the potential impact of managerial respon- siveness, hut using a longer one would lead to using survey responses (i.e., independent and con- trol variables) from employees who were predomi- nantly no longer employed in the restaurant. Turn- over data for each restaurant were captured from the human resotu-ce records cleaned (i.e., stripped of identifying personal information) and trans-
534 Academy of Management Journal April
ferred to us by the sponsor organization. Turnover was measured as the number of employee exits as a percent of the average number of employees be- tween time 1 (beginning of month 1] and time 2 (end of six months after voice ratings were col- lected]. We used the average number of employees across the six months to account for fluctuations in employee number; this measure is consistent with previous computations of turnover (Price, 1977].
Control variables. Recent meta-analyses suggest several antecedents that promote or inhibit turn- over (Griffeth et al , 2000; Hom & Griffeth, 1995]. To account for these mechanisms, as well as those that might influence the relationship between voice and exit, we used a variety of control variables. We first controlled for several characteristics of each restau- rant's employees. We controlled for average em- ployee tenure in each unit, which is one of the strongest demographic predictors of turnover, be- cause longer-tenured employees are less likely to quit in subsequent periods (Griffetb et al., 2000]. Given that minority groups in the U.S. are more likely to quit (Hom & Griffeth, 1995], we also con- trolled for minority racial groups, measured as the percentage of African American and Hispanic em- ployees in each iniit.
Second, we controlled for several different em- ployee attitudes—job satisfaction and justice per- ceptions—as these can influence turnover. Job sat- isfaction is the best job attitude predictor of turnover; when employees are more satisfied, they are less likely to leave or engage in actions that lead to involuntary termination (Griffeth et al., 2000; Hom & Griffeth, 1995]. We used one item ("Overafl I am satisfied with this restaurant as a place to work"] to measure job satisfaction, as global mea- sures are appropriate to measinre an employee's satisfaction with her/his overall position within a company (Ironson, Smith, Brannick, Gibson, & Paul, 1989]. We controlled for interactional justice perceptions, which refer to interpersonal treatment received at a workplace, using items adapted from Bies and Moag (1986]. Those employees who feel that they are not treated in a polite manner or with respect are more likely to voluntarily or involun- tarily exit an organization (Aquino, Griffeth, Allen, & Hom, 1997].
Third, we controlled for two leader characteris- tics (Griffeth et al., 2000]. We controlled for abusive supervision because previous research has shown that employees who work under abusive leaders are more likely to exit an organization (Tepper, 2000], We therefore used items adapted from Tep-
per's (2000] abusive leadership scale to account for this alternative explanation of turnover. Note that each of these three individually measured percep- tual control variables (overall satisfaction, justice, and abusive leadership] also met commonly recom- mended statistical thresholds for aggregation (e.g., all F-test values for ICCl significantly different from zero at p < .01]. Second, we also controlled for each GM's teniure at the company to account for experience managing a restaurant and its employ- ees. New GMs may also have not yet developed the political capital in the organization needed to ob- tain resources for making improvements or to be influential in decisions affecting their restaiurant.
Fourth, we controlled for other restaurant char- acteristics that can affect work environment and subsequent tvu-nover rates, including size, age, date of most recent store remodel, and being a training restaurant. We controlled for restaurant size (mea- sured as number of employees] because size has been shown to be related to administrative com- plexity and ttirnover in previous studies (Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998]. Restaurants were considered new by senior leaders, and therefore not yet comparable to established restaurants, if they had been open for less than 18 months. We thus included a dummy variable (0 = "open for more than 18 months," 1 = "open for less than 18 months"] to account for restaurant newness. We also controlled for the number of months since each restaurant had last been remodeled because (as learned through interviews in the company], this could affect work environment and subsequent exit behavior. This association is consistent with aspects of socio-technical systems theory (Trist, Higgins, Murray, & Pollock, 1963] noting the im- portance of the physical work environment to em- ployee attitudes and behavior. Finally, we also found that several restaurants were used for train- ing new employees. New employees placed in these restaurants for training purposes do not count as full members of the training restaurants; they are counted as members of their home restaurants. Nonetheless, these training restaurants are chosen because of tbeir exceptional performance and, thus, the turnover rate for these restaurants should be lower than those for others. Given their unique purpose, we included a dummy variable (0 = "not a training restaurant," 1 = "training restaurant"] to control for this condition.
Fifth, we accounted for external labor market conditions, which have been recognized to affect tiurnover rates (Griffeth et al., 2000]. We measured
2013 McClean, Burris, and Detert 535
both the number of blue-collar laborers and the average household income within a three-mile ra- dius of the restatirant. We obtained these statistics from the marketing department of the chain's cor- porate headquarters, which drew them from pub- licly available economic data (e.g., from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics). Each of these variables controls for differences in the external labor market that could affect oppor- tunities for alternative employment. For example, employees in areas with fewer blue-collar laborers and higher average income may have differential opportunities for alternative forms of similar em- ployment, which could affect individuals' deci- sions to quit or to engage in risky behaviors that might get them fired.
Analysis Strategy
Our analyses are conducted at the restaurant level. Each restaurant is embedded in a district and, further, in a division containing multiple districts. Such groupings call into question whether the res- taurant-level data are independent. Therefore, prior to conducting our analyses, we employed multi- level analyses to explicitly model the nonindepen- dence resulting from restaurant division [n = 4) and district [n = 32) groupings (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The between-division and between- district variance are not statistically different from zero, meaning that the variance attributable to each higher level is insignificant in explaining variance in otir restaurant-level dependent variable. There- fore, we used ordinary least squares regression at the restaurant level in the analyses reported here (Gelman & Hill, 2007). The pattern and significance of our results are unchanged if we employ multi- level models.
RESULTS
We conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the discriminant validity of our three moderator variables. Fit indexes from a CFA model (e.g., RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.94) indicate that the hypothesized three-factor structure fits the data well. We also estimated three two-factor models (one combining managerial par- ticipation in decision making and managerial ac- cess to organizational resources, one combining managerial participation in decision making and management team change orientation, and one combining managerial access to organizational re- soiurces and management team change orientation) and a one-factor model (all three moderators load- ing on the same factor) to assess more parsimonious models. All indexes from the more parsimonious models indicate that each had a significantly worse fit to the data than did the hypothesized three- factor model. We conducted a chi-square difference test for each model (relative to the hypothesized model) and foimd that the more parsimonious models were significantly different (worse-fitting) at p < .001. This analysis provides statistical sup- port for construct differentiation. See Table 2 for all results.
Table 3 shows the correlations, means, and stan- dard deviations for the study variables. The pat- terns of the raw correlations are consistent with past research. For instance, employee satisfaction (r = – .23, p < .01) and interactional justice (r = -.14, p < .05) are negatively related to turnover. Addi- tionally, restaurant remodeling date is positively related (r = .19, p < .01) to turnover, and training status is negatively related to turnover (r = -.20, p < .01). One might also expect that the managerial responsiveness behaviors would be related to turn- over directly. However, although management
TABLE 2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results"
Factor Structure x'/df C n RMSEA RMSEA CI NFI NfNFI AIC
1. Three-factor model 2. Two-factor model: PDM + CO 3. Two-factor model: PDM + AOR 4. Two-factor model: CO + AOR 5. One-factor model
" "AOR" is unit manager access to organizational resources; "CO" is local management team change orientation; "PDM" is unit manager participation in decision making.
**p < .01
62.76
130.99
322.19
99.25
358.52
41 43 43 43 44
1.53
3.05
7.49
2.31
8.15
0.98
0.91
0.72
0.94
0.68
0.06
0.12
0.22
0.09
0.23
(0.02-0.09)
(0.09-0.15)
(0.19-0.24)
(0.07-0.12)
(0.20-0.25)
0.94
0.87
0.69
0.90
0.66
0.97
0.88
0.64
0.92
0.61
-19.24
44.99
236.19
13.25
270.62
68.23(2)**
259.43(2)**
36.49(2)**
295.76(3)**
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2013 McGlean, Burris, and Detert 537
team change orientation is negatively related to turnover (r = -.18, p < .05), both managerial par- ticipation in decision making and access to organ- izational resources are not significantly associated with imit turnover at the bivariate level. Addition- ally, unit-level voice is not significantly directly related to employee turnover (r = .004, n.s.).
We conducted four regression analyses to assess the interaction between voice and each variable of interest (see Table 4); the first three include one interaction term only, and the final model includes the three interaction terms simultaneously. To en- hance the interpretation of the main effects and reduce multicoUinearity concerns, we centered all variables involved in the interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991). First, we examined the relationship between the control variables and unit-level turn- over. As model 1 shows, collectively these vari-
ables significantly contribute to the model's ex- planatory power (AF = 5.05, df = 136, p < .001) and explain 35 percent of the variance in lagged turnover. Several individual control variables re- main significantly related to turnover in the regres- sion, such as average employee tenure (ß = -0.34, p < .01), percent African American employees [ß = -0.22, p < .01), percent Hispanic employees (ß = -0.24, p < .01), number of employees (ß = -0.32, p < .01), months since the restaurant had been remodeled (ß = 0.21, p < .05), and number of blue-collar workers within a three-mile radius of the restainrant (ß = 0.20, p < .05).
Second, we entered the variables for employee voice, managerial access to organizational re- sources, managerial participation in decision mak- ing, and local management team change orienta- tion. Results are presented in models 2-4 of Table
TABLE 4 Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results for the Six-Month Unit-Level Turnover Rate"
Variables'"
Gontrol variables Average tenure Percent African American Percent Hispanic Employee satisfaction Justice perceptions Abusive leadership GM tenure Number of employees New restaurant Months since last remodeling Training restaurant Blue-collar workers within 3 miles Average household income within 3 miles Main effects Employee voice Manager AOR Manager PDM Management team CO Interactions Voice X manager AOR Voice X manager PDM Voice X management team CO
Adjusted iî^ F
Control Model
Model 1
-0.34* -0.22** -0.24** -0.17
0.05 0.03 0.08
-0.32** -0.05
0.21* 0.01 0.20*
-0.09
0.35
0.28 5.05**
Model 2
-0.34** -0.22** -0.24** -0.17
0.05 0.04 0.08
-0.33** -0.05
0.21* 0.02 0.20*
-0.09
-0.04 0.01
0.35 0.00 0.27 4.33**
Main Effects
Model 3
-0.36** -0.18* -0.23** -0.12
0.02 0.02 0.09
-0.34** -0.07
0.21* 0.01 0.21*
-0.12
-0.02
-0.19*
0.38 0.03 0.30 4.94**
Model 4
-0.35** -0.19* -0.23** -0.17
0.04 0.01 0.07
-0.30** -0.05
0.24* 0.01 0.20*
-0.11
-0.04
-0.16*
0.37 0.02 0.29 4.76**
Model 5
-0.36** -0.23** -0.21** -0.13
0.03 0.03 0.08
-0.31** -0.05
0.26* 0.01 0.19*
-0.14
-0.04 0.03
-0.19*
0.38 0.03 0.29 4.56**
Moderation
Model 6
-0.35** -0.20* -0.20* -0.14
0.05 0.02 0.09
-0.35** -0.06
0.25* 0.01 0.18*
-0.15
-0.03
-0.17*
-0.17*
0.40 0.05 0.32 5.05**
Model 7
-0.39** -0.24* -0.18* -0.19*
0.08 -0.01
0.04 -0.28** -0.07
0.30** 0.01 0.24**
-0.14
-0.11
-0.15
-0.26** 0.42 0.07 0.34 5.50**
Model 8
-0.43** -0.21** -0.16* -0.13
0.03 0.00 0.08
-0.28 -0.28**
0.32** 0.00 0.22**
-0.18*
-0.05 0.16
-0.17* -0.16*
-0.12 -0.06 -0.16*
0.46 0.11 0.37 4.97**
" n = 136. Standardized coefficients are reported. ^ "AOR" is unit manager access to organizational resources; "CO" is local management team change orientation; "PDM" is unit manager
participation in decision making. * p < .05
**p < .01
538 Academy of Management Journal April
4. Employee voice is not significantly related to turnover at the unit level. Both unit manager par- ticipation in decision making and management team change orientation are significantly related to turnover (ß = -0.19, p < .05, and ß = -0.16, p < .05, respectively).
Finally, we examined the relationship between voice and turnover as moderated by our three lead- ership variables in models 5-8. We proposed in Hypothesis 1 that manager access to organizational resources would moderate the relationship be- tween employee voice and exit at the restaurant level. As shown in model 5 of Table 4, the interac- tion term between voice and manager access to organizational resources is significantly related to employee turnover (ß = -0.19, p < .05) and ex- plains a significant amount of variance over and above the control variables and main effects of the moderator variables (AJF^ = 5.60, df= 136, p < .05). To assess whether the form of this, and the other, interactions is consistent with our hypotheses, we plotted the interactions according to the guidelines provided by Aiken and West (1991), plotting re- sults at high and low levels of each variable (one standard deviation above and below the mean). As shown in Figure 2, the relationship between voice and turnover when manager access to resources is high versus low is in the predicted direction. We followed the approach of Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006) to compute the region of statistical significance of the simple slopes of the interaction in Z-score units. Specifically, we found that when Z-scores are higher than 0.88, (i.e., high access to organizational resources), the negative relationship
between voice and turnover is statistically signifi- cant (p < .05). When the Z-scores are lower than -2.00 (i.e., low access to organizational resources), the positive relationship between voice and turn- over is statistically significant (p < .05). These re- sults are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
We propose in Hypothesis 2 that managerial par- ticipation in decision making moderates the rela- tionship hetween employee voice and exit at the unit (here, restaurant) level. As shown in model 6 of Table 4, the interaction term between voice and managerial participation in decision making is sig- nificantly related to employee turnover (ß = -0.17, p < .05) and explains a significant amount of vari- ance over and above the control variables and main effects of the moderator terms (AF = 4.62, df= 136, p < .05). As shown in Figure 3, the relationship between voice and turnover when manager partic- ipation in decision making is high versus low is in the predicted direction. Specifically, using Preacher et al.'s (2003) regions of significance method, we found that when Z-scores are higher than 1.77, (i.e., high participation in decision mak- ing), the negative relationship between voice and turnover is statistically significant (p < .05). When the Z-scores are lower than -2.68 (i.e., low access to organizational resources), the positive relation- ship between voice and turnover is statistically sig- nificant (p < .05). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
We proposed in Hypothesis 3 that the manage- ment team change orientation moderates the rela- tionship between unit-level employee voice and exit. As shown in model 7 of Table 4, the interac-
FIGURE 2 Interaction between Unit-Level Voice and Unit Manager Access to Organizational Resources
2 . 3 –
2 .2 –
2 . 1 –
2 –
1.9-Turnover at
Six Months
1.7-
1.6-
1.5-
1.4
>— Low unit manager access to organizational resources
I— High unit manager access to organizational resources
Low Voice High Voice
2013 McClean, Burris, and Detert 539
FIGURE 3 Interaction between Unit-Level Voice and Unit Manager Participation in Decision Making
•Turnover at
Six Months
2.3-|
2.2-
2.1-
2 –
1.9-
1.7-
1.6-
1.5-
1.4
>— Low unit manager participation in decision making
I— High unit manager participation in decision making
Low Voice High Voice
tion • term between voice and management team change orientation is significantly related to em- ployee turnover (ß = -0.26, p < .01] and explains a significant amount of variance over and above the main effects (AF^ = 10.77, df = 136, p < .01]. Figure 4 displays the interaction pattern supporting our prediction. Specifically, we found that when Z-scores are higher than 0.13, (i.e., high manage- ment team change orientation], the negative rela- tionship between voice and tvurnover is statistically significant (p < .05]. When the Z-scores are lower than -0.84 (i.e., low management team change ori- entation], the positive relationship between voice and tiurnover is statistically significant (p < .05]. These results offer support for Hypothesis 3.
Last, to test their relative strength we entered all three interactions into the regression model simul- taneously. As shovra in model 8 of Table 4, the interaction between voice and management team change orientation remains significantly related to employee turnover (ß = -0.16, p < .05], but the other two interactions do not. We consider these results further in the Discussion section.
Robustness Checks
We conducted additional analyses to ensure the robustness of tbe results presented above. First, despite our attempts to control for many different alternative explanations for turnover and for factors
FIGURE 4 Interaction between Unit-Level Voice and Management Team Change Orientation
Turnover at
2.2-
2.1-
2 –
1.9-
Six Months 1-8-
1.7-
1.6-
1.5-
1.4
Low management team change orientation High Management team change orientation
Low Voice High Voice
540 Academy of Management Journal April
that might affect the relationship between unit- level employee voice and tinrnover, there is a rea- sonable possibility that other explanations might remain unaccounted for. We therefore ran three additional models in which we also controlled for each prior year's turnover rate in each restaurant to account for other sources of unobserved heteroge- neity. All interactions remained significant and the pattern of results stayed the same (manager access to organizational resources X voice: ß = -0.14, p < .05; manager participation in decision making X voice: ß = -0.11, p < .05; management team change orientation X voice: ß = -0.25, p < .01). Second, because our turnover data are slightly skewed, we reran all models using a log transfor- mation of turnover to account for nonnormality. Again, all interactions remained significant and the pattern of results stayed the same (manager access to organizational resources X voice: ß = -0.17, p < .05; manager participation in decision making X voice: ß – 0.13, p < .05; management team change orientation X voice: ß = -0.29, p < .01). Finally, to reduce concerns that spurious suppression could affect oiu: results, given the number of control vari- ables that we included in our analyses (Becker, 2005), we reran the analyses taking out one control variable at a time to examine the effects on the significance levels of the interactions. Of the 39 regressions run in this manner, 97 percent of the interactions stay significant (p < .05) or marginally significant (p < .10) when one control variable is removed. Although these results alone cannot com- pletely rule out the possibility of suppression, along with the theoretical rationale for each control variable's inclusion, they bolster confidence in the robustness of our results.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we used theory from the organiza- tional sciences and empirical evidence to recon- sider and build upon several aspects of Hirschman's (1970) seminal framework about voice and exit in organizations. First, we challenged the notion that the outcomes of voice, including em- ployee turnover, should be generally conceptual- ized at the individual level (i.e., the level of the speaker). Instead, we argued and demonstrated through findings from analysis of 3,388 employee instances of improvement-oriented input that the very nature of voice is prosocial and thus voice has the potential to affect outcomes for not just the speaker but also for others whose performance or
well-being are likewise affected by the issues raised. Second, instead of considering voice and exit as mutually exclusive alternatives, we theo- rized the importance of examining the relationship between employee voice and exit and, in particular, argued and demonstrated empirically that the rela- tionship between the amount of speaking up by employees and subsequent turnover in an appro- priately defined unit is contingent on the ability and motivation of that unit's management to ad- dress the issues raised.
Our empirical results not only speak to long- standing theoretical frameworks, but are also of significant practical import, given the costly and vexing problem that turnover represents for organ- izations. In the food service industry, the context of this study, turnover rates generally exceed 100 per- cent annually, with employees citing poor manage- ment as a key reason for leaving (Kacmar, Andrews, Van Rooy, Steilberg, & Cerrone, 2006; Zuber, 2001). Though turnover rates range significantly, and are obviously lower in other industries, turnover is disruptive and expensive everywhere (Mueller & Price, 1989; Staw, 1980) because it inevitably raises labor costs related to recruiting, selecting, and training new hires (Oi, 1962; Sagie, Birati, & Tziner, 2002) and lowers organizational performance (Kac- mar et al., 2006; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005). This study highlights yet another significant and ironic cost of turnover: places with high levels of em- ployee voice and thus many improvement-oriented ideas can be the same places that lose the most employees when management is unwilling or un- able to respond. Even at a conservative estimate of $500 to replace an employee in this context (Kac- mar et al., 2006), the annual savings associated with, for example, a management team that is one standard deviation higher than the mean on change orientation compared to one that is one standard deviation lower would exceed $1,600,000 for an organization with the same number and size of restaurants as investigated here.^
^ To obtain the cost value, first we calculated the pre- dicted turnover from the regressions. We then multiplied this coefficient by two to obtain the predicted annual turnover rate (recall that our dependent variable was the turnover for six months). Then, using the average number of employees at each store (48), we calculated the num- ber of employees to be replaced when tbe moderator is high and low using the annual rate calculation. We then calculated tbe cost per store using an average cost of $500 per employee (Kacmar et al., 2006). To do tbis, we mul-
2013 McClean, Burris, and Detert 541
Contributions
Our theory and findings extend Hirschman's framework by acknowledging the social context for voice and the collective impact of suggestions made by employees. Our research seeks to align some of Hirschman's initial insights with the con- temporary understanding among voice scholars that voice in work contexts is a prosocial behavior— t̂hat is, to qualify as voice, the raising of an issue should have the potenüal to benefit a larger collective such as a work group or organization (Van D)nie et al., 2003). Whereas most prior research has focused on individ- ual-level antecedents to voice (Burris, Detert, & Chia- buxu, 2008; Tangirala & Rumanujam, 2008), we ex- amined tbe unit-level outcomes of voice, explicitly theorizing that the benefit or harm of different levels of management responsiveness to employee input ex- tend to many employees in a unit. Upon systematic examinafion of open-ended employee improvement suggesfions, we found that the overwhelming major- ity of employee comments were indeed consistent with the "would benefit more than just me if ad- dressed" criterion that defines voice as a prosocial behavior (Grant & Mayer, 2009; Van Dyne et al., 2003). This finding highlights the importance of con- sidering the outcomes of managerial responsiveness to employee voice among groups of employees, rather than just those who speak up about certain issues or just those who managers are more likely to be respon- sive to.
Prior studies have often treated voice as the end result, usually suggesting rather than testing any downstream relationships between voice and desir- able or undesirable outcomes. Research building on Hirschman's (1970) framework has characterized voice as replacing need to exit because it inevitably brings about improvements that address the sources of employee dissatisfaction if given enough time (e.g., Withey & Cooper, 1989). Such logic ex- tends beyond turnover, as scholars have argued that voice should affect other group-level outcomes such as change effectiveness (Morrison & Milliken, 2000) and performance (Morrison, 2011). These ar-
tiplied the number of employees to be replaced by the $500 value for botb the low and high moderator situa- tions. To ohtain the total cost for the company, we mul- tiplied the cost per store value times 139, the number of units in this particular company. To obtain the cost sav- ings value, we then subtracted the value calculated from the high moderator situation from the low moderator situation.
guments rest largely on the assumption that actual learning occurs and that substantive changes take place. We explore this view theoretically and em- pirically by acknowledging that managers often have limited latitude and ability to initiate substan- tive cbange and that, as a result, they are often constrained in addressing employee concerns. Our results show that a high level of voice alone is not a sign that employees are more likely to stay; in- stead, the relationship between voice and exit within work imits is dependent on whether man- agers are willing and able to do something with employees' ideas for improvement. Thus, our re- search highlights the importance of considering management responsiveness as an important deter- minant of whether voice leads to positive or nega- tive outcomes for a work unit.
Our research also makes several important theo- retical contributions to the leadership literature. At a broad level, our results add to contingency per- spectives on leadership. Much recent leadership research has predominantly focused on direct rela- tionships between aspects of leadership and effec- tiveness outcomes (Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996), includ- ing employee turnover (Graen, Liden, & Hoel, 1982). Our research fits with a recent resurgence in the leadership literature that examines the contin- gencies, rather than main effects, of leadership on vmit-level outcomes (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011). For example. Grant and colleagues (2011) found that the relationship between leader extra- version and unit effectiveness is contingent on the proactivity of employees. Our study demonstrates how the value of specific leadership behaviors for reducing exit depends, in part, on the level of voice activity by subordinates. More specific to the phe- nomenon of voice, our treatment of leadership rep- resents a significant departure from the focus on leadership characteristics as antecedents to voice behavior. Past research shows, for example, that specific leader behaviors or styles like transforma- tional characteristics or leader openness (Detert & Burris, 2007) stimulate more voice. Complement- ing this research, our results show the implications of managerial actions when voice is already pres- ent. Namely, our findings suggest that leader re- sponsiveness to voice also affects the choices of employees after spealcing up has occurred.
Finally, our findings are also theoretically and practically relevant for those interested in minimiz- ing turnover. Our study explicitly acknowledges and demonstrates that turnover decisions are likely
542 Academy of Management Journal April
to be predictable at meaningful aggregate levels based on social factors—such as managerial re- sponsiveness to voice—that are similarly experi- enced by defined groups of employees (Krackhardt & Porter, 1986). Further, by examining when unit- level voice affects turnover rates, we uncover po- tential levers for leaders to use to minimize turn- over, such as providing managers with resources to make changes or hiring managers who are more oriented toward change. Also, beyond our focal variables, the set of control variables we included explained fully 35 percent of the variance in lagged turnover. Of these alternative explanations, several, including the percentages of African American and Hispanic employees and the number of months since a restaurant was last remodeled, are signifi- cantly related to exit. Gollectively, our findings ex- tend understanding of unit-level factors that influ- ence employee turnover and thus offer important avenues for future research.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
Several features of this study bolster confidence in our results. First, we collected data from multi- ple sources, including observer ratings of employee voice. Second, we used objective turnover data for the six months after the assessment of voice, rather than concurrent turnover statistics or turnover in- tention reports (which may or may not result in actual exit). Third, we found support for our hy- potheses about the relationship between unit-level voice and exit after first controlling for an extensive set of theoretically meaningful alternative explana- tions of turnover. Fourth, our results are robust to multiple additional analyses, including models that control for prior turnover, models that use log-transformed turnover as the dependent vari- able, and models that check for suppression effects.
Despite these strengths, several limitations of our study should be addressed in future research. First, we tested our hypotheses in a particular context— one where turnover is high and factors such as organizational commitment are relatively low. Un- derstanding the generalizability of our results thus requires additional research in other contexts. For instance, the relevant size of the group or unit of people that managerial responsiveness to voice will affect likely varies. We used single restaurants as the unit of aggregation in this study because they fit the nature of the types of issues raised; however, in other contexts, such as scientific research groups or product development teams, the types of issues
raised may make the appropriate level of analysis much smaller. For example, in academia, we might expect the appropriate level of aggregation to be the department rather than school level. Second, future studies could benefit from additional and more pre- cise measures. For example, the use of objective measures of access to resources and other-source ratings of manager participation in decision making and management team change orientation would reduce the potential biases of self-report measures. Additionally, in arguing that our moderators are proxies for managerial responsiveness to employ- ees' concerns, we suggested that reduced turnover is likely the result of actual improvements resulting from employees' voice and/or that employees feel sufficiently satisfied by managers taking their con- cerns seriously even when substantive changes do not always occur. In this study, we were not able to empirically assess each of these potential medi- ators between managerial responsiveness and sub- sequent employee exit. We were also unable to disentangle the voluntary from the involuntary turnover rates for each unit and thus determine more precisely to what extent when employees speak up, leader responsiveness is related to em- ployee decisions to quit, leader decisions to fire, or both.
Future research could also more robustly exam- ine both individual- and group-level effects by col- lecting individual-level responses for the modera- tors and individual-level turnover data. Such data would allow for a multilevel analysis that more precisely disentangles the extent to which em- ployee exit is an individual decision made in reac- tion to leader behaviors directed to each employee who speaks up or predominantly influenced by the larger social context, including whether improve- ments were made (or not made), irrespective of who raises specific issues. Researchers might also use other designs and data analysis approaches to examine whether employees exit after they or oth- ers have spoken up because they were bothered by a lack of response to a single, specific issue or by a more general pattern of unresponsiveness to an ar- ray of work issues. Ballinger and Rockmann (2010), for example, suggested that relationships can change quickly, with the outcome of a particular event dramatically and permanently altering the state of a relationship. Similarly, the unfolding model of turnover (Lee & Mitchell, 1994) identifies shocks, or particularly jarring work-related events, as antecedent to voluntary exit. We suspect that—in contrast to the picture painted by
2013 McClean, Burris, and Detert 543
Hirschman (1970)—turnover usually results from an ongoing and building sense of frustration, dis- satisfaction, and change in performance rather than from a single issue or event, but the matter is an empirical question still open for adjudication. Fu- ture researchers should also consider measuring exit at different time periods. We chose a six-month turnover window hecause interviews with senior managers suggested this was an appropriate length of time in this context for assessing whether changes were attempted and succeeding (Mitchell & James, 2001). However, by collecting turnover rates at multiple time intervals, researchers would he ahle to test more precisely how managerial responsiveness affects subsequent employee behavior.
Beyond addressing the limitations of this study, future research could build upon our study and explore some of the unexpected findings. For ex- ample, we were surprised to find that when em- ployee voice was low and managerial access to organizational resources was low, employees were more likely to stay with the organization (as they were under conditions of high voice and high man- agerial access to resources). One possihle explana- tion for these findings is that when employee be- havior matches manager ability to make changes, employees are more likely to stay with an organi- zation than they are when employees' behavior is mismatched to their manager's orientation and ahility to make changes. Additionally, several of our focal variables (voice, manager access to organ- izational resources, and manger participation in decision making) are not directly related to turn- over. We have already explained our perspective on these findings (i.e., that the relationships he- tween voice and outcomes depend on what manag- ers do next) but recognize the need for future re- search in this area given the practical importance of such relationships. We were also surprised to find that abusive leadership did not have a significant impact on turnover in this study. This could stem from the low incidence of (and variance in) abusive leadership captured here. Or, it could be that, as with other aspects of leadership, the relationship between abusive leadership and turnover is contin- gent on factors such as norms in a given environ- ment and employee mobility options (Tep- per, 2000).
Last, we note that all three interactions are sig- nificant when estimated independently (models 5-7), but when all are included in one equation, only the interaction hetween voice and manage-
ment team change orientation remains significant (model 8). Statistically, this pattern of results may be due to the lack of power that results from simul- taneously testing the significance of three interac- tions with a sample of the size of our sample. The results may also be due to shared variance among our predictors, given that each interaction includes a common variable (voice). When predictors in- clude a common variable, it is harder to tease out the individual effects of each (Aiken & West, 1991). A more substantive reason for these results may he that modeling multiple interactions together is a very conservative test that speaks to the relative impact of each interaction when the others are con- trolled for. In our case, the test is more conservative hecause the three variables—managerial access to organizational resources, participation in decision making, and management team change orienta- tion—co-occur at a relatively high level in the ma- jority of our restaurants. For example, in 81 percent of the restaurants at which managers have ahove the mean level of participation in decision making, they also have above the mean level of access to resources (even though the raw correlation hetween participation in decision making and access to re- sources is .44). This fact—that our sample does not include many instances of all permutations of high versus low levels of each of our three moderators— makes it difficult to tease out unique effects in a single model. So although model 8 provides an opportunity to examine the relative magnitude of each interaction's effect, models 5-7 provide a clearer picture of the independent effect of each.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the outcomes of em- ployee voice rest, to a nontrivial extent, in the hands of managers; their responsiveness impacts whether voice proves beneficial or detrimental for the work unit and beyond. At the same time, our results emphasize a potential disadvantage of en- couraging employee voice: if leaders are not ahle and prepared to act on problems identified and opportunities suggested, employees may look to find employment where their input has more im- pact or even engage in behaviors that provoke man- agers to remove them. Given the significant cost of turnover, as well as the other losses associated with the failure to respond to employees' knowledge and ideas, managers would he wise to enhance their, and their management teams', ability and motiva- tion to take action when employees speak up.
544 Academy of Management Journal April
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Elizabeth J. McClean ([email protected]) is a Ph.D. can- didate in human resource management and organiza- tional behavior at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. Her current research fo- cuses on the antecedents and outcomes of employee voice and the role of HR and leadership on employee Eind firm outcomes.
Ethan R. Burris ([email protected]) is an associate professor of management at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University. His cur- rent research focuses on understanding the antecedents and consequences of employees speaking up or staying silent in organizations; leadership behaviors, processes, and outcomes; and the effective management of conflict generated by multiple perspectives.
James R. Detert (jdetert@cornell!edu) is an associate pro- fessor of management at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. His current research interests include voice and silence in organizations, lead- ership influences on voice and ethical decision making, and cognitive moral disengagement as a predictor of un- ethical behavior. He received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from HarvcU'd University.
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